Jump to content

Siad Barre

Extended-protected article
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Siad Barre
Maxamed Siyaad Barre
محمد زياد بري
𐒑𐒖𐒄𐒖𐒑𐒗𐒆 𐒈𐒘𐒕𐒛𐒆 𐒁𐒖𐒇𐒇𐒗
Official portrait, c.1970
3rd President of Somalia
In office
21 October 1969  26 January 1991
Vice President
Preceded by
Succeeded byAli Mahdi Muhammad
General Secretary of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
In office
26 June 1976  26 January 1991
Preceded byOffice established
Succeeded byOffice abolished
Chairman of the Somali Revolutionary Council
In office
21 October 1969  1 July 1976
Preceded byOffice established
Succeeded byOffice abolished
12th Chairperson of the Organisation of African Unity
In office
12 June 1974  28 July 1975
Preceded byYakubu Gowon
Succeeded byIdi Amin
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Somali Armed Forces
In office
21 October 1969  26 January 1991
Preceded byOffice established
Succeeded byOffice abolished
2nd Commander-in-Chief of the Somali National Army
In office
20 April 1965  25 November 1969
Preceded byDaud Abdulle Hirsi
Succeeded byMohammad Ali Samatar
1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Somali National Army
In office
12 April 1960  20 April 1965
Preceded byOffice established
Succeeded byMohamed Ainanshe Guled
Personal details
BornMohammed Siad Barre
c. (1919-10-06)6 October 1919
Died2 January 1995(1995-01-02) (aged 75)
Cause of deathHeart attack
Resting placeGarbaharey, Gedo, Somalia
Party
Spouses
  • Khadija Maalim
  • Dalayad Hajji Hashi
  • Fadumo Aw Muse
  • Falhado Gure
  • Mariam Hassan
Relations
Children
Parents
  • Siad Barre Abdulle Yussuf (father)
  • Shaqlan Warfa (mother)
Military Academy of Modena
Military service
Allegiance
Branch/service
Years of service
1935–1992
Rank Major general
Commands
  • Head of the Crime Investigation Department of the British Colonial Police in Somalia and Kenya (1945-1950)
  • Commander of the Banadir Regional Police (1955-1960)
Battles/wars

Mohammed Siad Barre (/mˈhæmɪd sˈɑːd ˈbɑːr/ ; Somali: Maxamed Siyaad Barre; Arabic: محمد زياد بري; c. 6 October 1919 – 2 January 1995) was a Somali military officer, politician, and revolutionary who served as the third president of Somalia from 21 October 1969 to 26 January 1991.

Barre, the commander of the Somali National Army, became president of Somalia after the 1969 coup d'état that overthrew the Somali Republic following the assassination of President Abdirashid Shermarke. The Supreme Revolutionary Council military junta under Barre reconstituted Somalia as a one-party Marxist–Leninist communist state, renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic and adopted scientific socialism. Barre spoke three languages, English, Somali and Italian.

Barre's early rule was characterised by attempts at widespread modernization, nationalization of banks and industry, promotion of cooperative farms, a new writing system for the Somali language, and anti-tribalism. In 1976, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party became the country's vanguard party. The following year Barre launched the Ogaden War against Ethiopia's Derg regime, supporting the Western Somali Liberation Front on a platform of Somali nationalism and pan-Somalism. Barre's popularity was highest during the seven months between September 1977 and March 1978 when Barre captured virtually the entirety of the Somali region.[2] It declined from the late-1970s following Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War, triggering the Somali Rebellion and severing ties with the Soviet Union. Somalia then allied itself with the Western powers and especially the United States for the remainder of the Cold War, although it maintained its Marxist–Leninist regime and also drew close to China.

Opposition grew in the 1980s and in 1991, Barre's government collapsed as the Somali Rebellion successfully ejected him from power, leading to the Somali Civil War and a massive power vacuum in its wake. Barre was forced into exile in Nigeria, where he died in 1995 on the way to the hospital after suffering a heart attack.[3][4][5]

Early years

Mohamed Siad Barre was born at a time when birth records were unknown in Somalia. Speculations have been cast upon his exact birth year ranging from 1909 to 1921; nevertheless, it is generally agreed that he was born to pastoral parents. His unofficial birthplace is said to be in Las Ga'al, which is a district of the El-Gab region, presently known as Shilabo in the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia.[6][7] His official birthplace is recorded to be the city of Garbahare, which is a part of the provincial capital of the Gedo region of Somalia.[8][9][10] Mohammed was born to a Marehan father and Ogaden mother of the greater Darod clan.[7][6] The colonial powers prevented ethnic Somalis born outside the two protectorates (Italian and British) from conscribing into their respective territorial forces. By concealing his unofficial birthplace like many others, it enabled him to be eligible for the Italian colonial police force and military in Somalia.

He was given the childhood nickname Barre, referring to extrovertedness.[11] In 1941, Mohammed, aged twenty, joined the police force which was then under the authority of the British military, who occupied it since the initiation of World War II hostilities. Mohammed's career in the police force led him to the capital city, Mogadishu, to pursue his education both in the public and private sectors.[12] In the 1940s he completed secondary school education. By 1950, when the British transferred their administration to Italy, Mohammed Siad had achieved the highest rank possible for an indigenous, that of chief police inspector.[13] MIT professor Irving Kaplan writes that the Somali Gendarmerie successfully disarmed and brought a number of pro-Italian guerrilla groups under control.[14]

Role in anti Italian SYL riots in Mogadishu

British colonial officials documented extensive SYL membership within the Somali Gendarmerie, with Lieutenant Colonel Thorne reporting that approximately 60% of the force belonged to the SYL[15]. Other British officials similarly noted that the majority of Somali civil servants serving under the British administration were SYL members. This overlap between the security forces and the party would prove decisive during the 1948 Mogadishu riots.The BMA favored the employment of SYL members in both the civil service and the gendarmerie, and by 1948 the party’s identification with the BMA had become so close that holding an SYL party card was practically a prerequisite for government employment.[16][17]

Tensions came to a head following the arrival of a United Nations fact-finding mission, when the SYL organised a large rally intended to demonstrate popular support for Somali independence. In response, Italian residents staged an unauthorised counter-demonstration, dispatching truckloads of pro-Italian supporters who drove into crowds of SYL demonstrators.[18]

As violence escalated, Gendarmerie officers many of described as SYL members, did not remain neutral. Officers were seen firing on members of the pro-Italian Conferenza party, and fought alongside the SYL against Italian and pro-Italian demonstrators. The riots ultimately left 54 Italians and 14 pro-Italian supporters dead, the latter killed while attempting to shield the Italian demonstrators. In the aftermath, Italian officials held the Somali Gendarmerie directly responsible for the Italian killings.

''The Somali Gendarmerie, which was supposed to secure public order, in many cases joined the rioters. Captain A. T. Bevan of the British South African Police, at that time serving in Mogadishu, reported that he saw a Gendarmerie askari ‘carrying a rifle and stopping to fire every now and again at a group of Conferenza supporters'' [15].

In 1952, he and several of his colleagues, including Hussein Kulmiye Afrah, Liiq-Liiqato, Shegow and Daud Abdulle, attended a military academy in Italy where he chiefly studied politics and administration. Between 1950 and 1960, Mohammed Siad heavily pursued studies in languages, ultimately mastering Italian, English and Swahili. After finishing his course he was promoted to the rank of second lieutenant. In 1955, a year after completing his course in Rome he was awarded he position of police chief and subsequently assigned to the capital city, Mogadishu. By 1958 he reached the rank of major whilst being the head of the security forces, including the executive director of the Italian police. He also eventually became vice-commander of the Somali Army when the country gained its independence in 1960 as the Somali Republic.[6][19][20][10]

Rise to power

Decline of the civilian government 1960-1969

In 1959 elections was held to decide the first post independence Somali government. The election was however rigged against the Greater Somalia League party, which was an anti-Italian SYL splinter group. The CIA verified the rigging and cast doubt whether the 1960s Somali government was truly a representative of its people.[21]

''The rigging, if given wide public attention is likely to create adverse world opinion and raise serious doubts whether Somali Government is representative of people.''

By the early 1960s, the Somali parliamentary system had begun to deteriorate visibly. In 1963, fighting broke out among members of parliament, and an assassination attempt was made against the governor of Galkayo the same year.[22][23] A US Peace Corps volunteer serving in Somalia during this period recounted regular armed clashes between rival factions, including one incident in which ten people were killed and a separate three-hour shootout in Baidoa.[24]

Corruption within the civilian government became increasingly difficult to conceal. By some accounts, the administration spent nearly five times the annual agriculture budget on land rovers to rig elections, a level of graft that was compared to New York’s notorious Tweed Ring of the 19th century and Capone.[25] The government also earned a reputation for squandering foreign aid; one report described it as a “graveyard of aid schemes,”[26] while the Los Angeles times noted that Somalia remained as impoverished as it had been at independence in 1960.[27]

President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke acknowledged and could not ignore the scale of the problem, publicly attributing the country’s drought crises in part to the conduct of corrupt Somali MPs.[28] General Siad Barre, then head of the armed forces, was similarly critical of the civilian government’s trajectory, telling The Times that its growing dependence on foreign aid was humiliating and fundamentally at odds with the goal of national self-reliance.[29]

''We cannot go hat in hand in search of funds because that will be humiliating and contrary to the principle of self-reliance to which the nation is committed. . . . The only sensible solution to the deficit problem is to tighten our belts and cut down on luxuries.''

In 1968, then Prime Minister Egal attributed Somalia’s inability to respond to the ongoing drought to an empty national treasury, a claim he made in an interview with The New York Times.[30] Contemporary accounts, however, attribute the depletion of state treasury funds in large part to Egal’s own use of government money to secure parliamentary support ahead of the 1969 elections.[31]


Egal, meanwhile, was later found to have distributed embezzled state funds to American nationals, including John Bainbridge, who was arrested and expelled from Somalia following the 1969 revolution.[32] Egal himself was alleged to have embezzled approximately 3 million Somali shillings, equivalent to roughly $26 million today.[33]

On the night of the coup, Egal was in the United States, where he had reportedly spent stolen government funds gambling Roulette in Las Vegas casinos.[34] Prior to this, he had attended a cocktail party in Beverly Hills celebrating a Hollywood production filmed in Somalia starring William Holden.[35] Following the assassination of President Abdirashid, Somali officials struggled to reach the Prime Minister; in the ensuing effort to locate him, the US-Somali Educated Embassy reportedly contacted the FBI for assistance.[36]

Assassination of Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke

President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke’s earlier election campaign had been substantially funded by the Soviet Union and other communist states, and as Prime Minister he had been the first Somali leader to extend diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China.[37]

Concerned by this trajectory and by the broader prospect of a Soviet-aligned Greater Somalia, the CIA began infiltrating Somali government ministries during the 1960s as part of a wider pattern of Cold War covert action across the continent. Former National security staffer, Roger Morris writes that up to $200,000, were directed toward pro-Western Somali politicians in an effort to reshape the country’s foreign policy alignment, with covert support said to have facilitated Mohamed Ibrahim Egal’s rise within the ruling Somali Youth League ahead of the 1967 elections.[38]

Once in office, Egal moved to curtail the influence of the Soviet-trained SNA, dismissing thousands of its personnel, while correspondingly strengthening the American-trained Somali police force as a counterweight.[39] This realignment contributed to friction between Egal and President Shermarke; rumors circulated that the two men were no longer on good terms, a rift that widened further when Egal attempted to transform Somalia into a one-party state on 3 October 1969.[40]

Former U.S. official Roy Stacy, who served in Somalia during the 1960s, described it as ironic that Abdirashid's assassin had been trained in the United States. According to Stacy, the assassin participated in a U.S.-sponsored public safety program and received firearms training at a shooting range in Washington, D.C., where he learned precision marksmanship[41]. Soviet state radio directly accused the CIA of orchestrating the assassination of Shermarke. In a broadcast, Radio Moscow declared that the gunman who shot and killed Sharmarke was acting on direct orders from the CIA.[42]


Roy Stacy:

“It was ironic that the man, who pulled the trigger on this assassination had been trained by the USA Public Safety Program. He learned how to shoot a gun at our pistol range here in Washington, DC, and apparently he learned to shoot straight.”

Henry Kissinger, then United States National Security Advisor, concluded that the assassin acted independently.[43] Abdirashid Shermarke, was assassinated in Las Anod in Northern Somalia on 15 October 1969. Shermarke had been visiting drought-stricken areas in the northeast when the assassin, Said Yusuf Ismail, shot and killed him.[44] On 21 October 1969, at 3:00 a.m., Siad Barre and the military overthrew the parliamentary government of the existing Somali Republic.[45] The assassin of former President Abdirashid Shermarke Ismail was tried, tortured, and executed by the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Notably, Ismail shared the same clan background as President Shermarke.[46]

Presidency

Barre with Romanian president Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1976

Barre assumed the position of president of Somalia, styled the "Victorious Leader" (Guulwade), and fostered the growth of a personality cult with portraits of him in the company of Marx and Lenin lining the streets on public occasions.[47]

Supreme Revolutionary Council

The Supreme Revolutionary Council established large-scale public works programs and successfully implemented an urban and rural literacy campaign, which helped dramatically increase the literacy rate. Barre began a program of nationalising industry and land, and the new regime's foreign policy placed an emphasis on Somalia's traditional and religious links with the Arab world, eventually joining the Arab League in 1974.[10] That same year, Barre also served as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU).[48]

In July 1976, Barre's SRC disbanded itself and established in its place the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), a one-party government based on scientific socialism and Islamic tenets. The SRSP was an attempt to reconcile the official state ideology with the official state religion. Emphasis was placed on the Muslim principles of social progress, equality and justice, which the government argued formed the core of scientific socialism and its own accent on self-sufficiency, public participation and popular control, as well as direct ownership of the means of production. While the SRSP encouraged private investment on a limited scale, the administration's overall direction was proclaimed to be Communist.[49]A new constitution was promulgated in 1979 under which elections for a People's Assembly were held. However, the politburo of Barre's Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party continued to rule.[50] In October 1980, the SRSP was disbanded, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council was re-established in its place.[49]

Economic policies and tax reforms

Siad Barre was critical of Italian colonial economic policy in Somalia, arguing that it had remained narrowly focused on banana cultivation and had failed to develop the territory’s economy beyond this single export, to the point that it undermined even Italy’s own long-term interests in the colony. This legacy left Somalia in a precarious position at independence: in 1960, its gross national product was among the lowest in Africa.[51]

''Among the many plaintive reproaches that Siad Barre used to address to Rome, one concerned the sphere of economic policy in Somalia. It did not see beyond bananas and beyond bananas it developed practically nothing. It was a colonialism that even did harm to its own interests.''

Following the 1969 revolution, Barre's government pursued a significant expansion of the livestock sector. Somalia’s cattle population, estimated at one million in 1965, grew to approximately four million by 1975.[52] Between 1970 and 1973, the government introduced a cattle-fattening program under which between 15,000 and 50,000 head of cattle were purchased for fattening, alongside an immunisation campaign that vaccinated roughly 800,000 cattle. [53] A dairy processing plant built with foreign investment in 1965 had failed due to poor maintenance and government neglect, but was later refurbished, expanded, and reopened as the “21st October Dairy Farm.”[54]

In 1976, Barre launched a state cattle-breeding program at the Afgoi, crossbreeding native cattle with foreign stock to develop animals better suited to Somalia’s harsh climate and capable of producing higher yields of milk and meat. These efforts contributed to a marked increase in livestock exports, which more than doubled in value to 295 million Somali shillings and quadrupled in volume compared with 1971.[55]

Stanford-trained economist Vali Jamal estimated Somalia’s GDP per capita under Barre’s government at $406 in 1978 equivalent to roughly $2,000 today, noting that agricultural output had likely been significantly underestimated in official statistics.[56] By this measure, Somalia’s per capita GDP surpassed that of several other African nations at the time, including Egypt, Ghana, Sudan, Tanzania, and Kenya, as well as most other East African states.[57][58][59][60] Vali's GDP per capita adjustment accounts only for under reported milk production and does not include other sectors that were also underestimated. As a result, Somalia's GDP per capita was likely significantly higher than Vali's cited figure of approximately $400.

This assessment was corroborated by Somalia’s first official national accounts, prepared in 1979 through three independent efforts undertaken jointly with the Somali Central Statistical Department — two by the UN Economic Commission for Africa and one by the World Bank (IBRD). Where GDP per capita had conventionally been cited at around $100, the IBRD’s calculation placed the figure at $342, a result that put Somalia well out of the league of the least developed countries entirely.[61] The report also estimated that 17 percent of the population fell below the poverty threshold a figure described as remarkably low compared with other African countries, vindicating the visual impression of a lack of abject poverty in urban Somalia, where shanty areas were rare and obvious signs of malnutrition rarer still.[62]

Barre's economic record was also frequently linked to broader assessments of its comparatively low levels of corruption. While many scholars of military rule in Africa argued that military governments were often as corrupt as the civilian administrations they replaced, many identified Barre’s government as an exception to this pattern. One such assessment noted that there have been exceptions, such as the 1969 coup in Somalia, which brought to power almost puritanical officers who sharply reduced corruption.[63] This view was echoed in a 1975 investigative hearing before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, which identified Somalia as one of the least corrupt nations in Africa at the time,[64] describing Barre’s government as having maintained a stable and effective administration for five years and noting his standing as a recognised leader who had recently completed a term as Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity.

This reputation for fiscal discipline stood in contrast to the corruption that had characterised the preceding civilian government: analysts had noted that financial mismanagement was so widespread under the pre-1969 government that it was unable to present a complete fiscal report due to irregularities within the administration. The national budget had run a deficit continuously since independence, Barre's government recorded Somalia’s first budget surplus in 1971, which was subsequently directed toward financing development projects. [65]

Agricultural reforms

In the early 1970s, the CIA issued a special assessment of Somalia’s economy, describing the task facing the new government as a “Herculean task” given the country’s arid terrain, limited resources, and largely undeveloped economy, in which most of its 2.8 million people relied on nomadic herding and subsistence agriculture for their livelihood.[66] The report attributed this difficult starting position in part to the civilian era’s development programs, which it characterised as inefficiently administered, having accomplished little beyond giving Somalia a reputation for squandering foreign aid.

Addressing the country’s resource constraints, the Barre government adopted seawater desalination technology developed in 1964 by Ukrainian-Israeli chemist Alexander Zarchin. This method, which removed salt particles from seawater, was adapted by Barre’s government in the early 1970s,[67] leading to the construction of a desalination plant that expanded access to clean water and irrigation. Barre identified reducing the disparity between northern and southern Somalia as a central goal of his agricultural policy,[68] alongside broader programs to combat overgrazing and boost food production. In 1973, government ministers were dispatched to Gabiley in north-western Somalia to instruct local communities on the importance and methods of improved food production.[69]

These efforts contributed to substantial gains over the following decade: sorghum production rose 87 percent, from an average of 139,000 tons in the 1970s to 260,000 tons by 1985, while maize production increased 162 percent over the same period, from 107,000 tons to 280,000 tons, leaving Somalia largely self-sufficient in both crops.[70] A UNICEF report from the period found that levels of absolute poverty and malnutrition in Somalia appeared markedly lower than in most other low-income sub-Saharan African economies, and noted no evidence of secular deterioration in these conditions over time.[71]

The government’s largest infrastructure undertaking in this period was the Fanole Dam, built with Chinese technical assistance. Construction began in 1977 and was completed in 1982; the project created thousands of jobs for Somalis and supplied electricity to southern Somalia.[72]

Tax reforms

Barre’s government undertook a marked expansion of the state’s capacity to collect revenue, an achievement widely seen as symbolising a break from the administrative weakness of the civilian era. Whereas the previous government had struggled to enforce taxation even in urban centers. The post 1969 government extended tax collection into rural and nomadic bush areas, reaching rural communities in the bush that had largely fallen outside the state’s fiscal reach.This institutional strengthening corresponded in a rise in tax revenue. From 1970 onward, tax revenue doubled by 1975.[73] [74]

Former US peace corps volunteer in 1969 writes:

''They've reclaimed a bunch of cars that the previous government had passed out to its friends, and they have begun to collect taxes in the bush. To a lot of people, they've definitely symbolized a shift from the previous corruption.''

Nationalism and Greater Somalia

Barre advocated the concept of a Greater Somalia (Soomaaliweyn), which refers to those regions in the Horn of Africa in which ethnic Somalis reside and have historically represented the predominant population, encompassing Somalia, Djibouti, the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and Kenya's former North Eastern Province.[75][76][77]

Foreign relations

Barre and Queen Juliana in 1978

Control of Somalia was of great interest to both the Soviet Union and the United States due to the country's strategic location at the mouth of the Red Sea. After the Soviets broke with Somalia in the late 1970s, Barre subsequently expelled all Soviet advisors, tore up his friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, and switched allegiance to the West, announcing this in a televised speech in English.[78] Somalia also broke all ties with the Eastern Bloc and the Second World (except China and Romania).[79] The United States stepped in and until 1989, was a strong supporter of the Barre government for whom it provided approximately US$100 million per year in economic and military aid,[80] meeting in 1982 with Ronald Reagan to announce the new relationship between the US and Somalia.[81]

In September 1972 Tanzanian-sponsored rebels attacked Uganda. Ugandan president Idi Amin requested Barre's assistance, and he subsequently mediated a non-aggression pact between Tanzania and Uganda. For his actions, a road in Kampala was named after Barre.[82]

On 17 and 18 October 1977, a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) group hijacked Lufthansa Flight 181 to Mogadishu, holding 86 hostages. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Barre negotiated a deal to allow a GSG 9 anti-terrorist unit into Mogadishu to free the hostages.[83]

In January 1986, Barre and the Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam met in Djibouti to normalise relations between their respective countries.[3][84] The Ethiopian-Somali agreement was signed by 1988 and Barre disbanded his clandestine anti-Ethiopian organisation the Western Somali Liberation Front.[3][84] In return, Barre hoped that Mengistu would disarm Somali National Movement rebels active on the Ethiopian side of the border; however did this not materialise since the SNM relocated to Northern Somalia in response to this agreement.[3][84]

Domestic programs

A public project initiated by the government was the Shalanbood Sanddune Stoppage: from 1971 onwards, a massive tree-planting campaign on a nationwide scale was introduced by Barre's administration to halt the advance of thousands of acres of wind-driven sand dunes that threatened to engulf towns, roads, and farmland.[85] By 1988, 265 hectares (650 acres) of a projected 336 ha (830 acres) had been treated, with 39 range reserve sites and 36 forestry plantation sites established.[86]

Car collision

In May 1986, President Barre suffered serious injuries in a life-threatening automobile collision near Mogadishu, when the car that was transporting him smashed into the back of a bus during a heavy rainstorm.[87] He was treated in a hospital in Saudi Arabia for head injuries, broken ribs and shock over a period of a month.[88][89] Lieutenant General Mohammad Ali Samatar, then vice-president, subsequently served as de facto head of state for the next several months. Although Barre managed to recover enough to present himself as the sole presidential candidate for re-election over a term of seven years on 23 December 1986, his poor health and advanced age led to speculation about who would succeed him in power. Possible contenders included his son-in-law General Ahmed Suleiman Abdille, who was at the time the Minister of the Interior, in addition to Barre's vice-president Lt. Gen. Samatar.[87][88]

Human rights abuses

Part of Barre's time in power was characterized by oppressive dictatorial rule, including persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents and dissidents. The United Nations Development Programme stated that "the 21-year regime of Siyad Barre had one of the worst human rights records in Africa."[90] In January 1990, the Africa Watch Committee, a branch of Human Rights Watch organizational released an extensive report titled "Somalia A Government At War with Its Own People" composing of 268 pages, the report highlights the widespread violations of basic human rights in the northern regions of Somalia. The report includes testi onies about the killing and conflict in northern Somalia by newly arrived refugees in various countries around the world. Systematic human rights abuses against the dominant Isaaq clan in the north was described in the report as "state sponsored terrorism" "both the urban population and nomads living in the countryside [were] subjected to summary killings, arbitrary arrest, detention in squalid conditions, torture, rape, crippling constraints on freedom of movement and expression and a pattern of psychological intimidation. The report estimates that 50,000 to 60,000 people were killed from 1988 to 1989."[91] Amnesty International went on to report that torture methods committed by Barre's National Security Service (NSS) included executions and "beatings while tied in a contorted position, electric shocks, rape of woman prisoners, simulated executions and death threats."[92]

In September 1970, the government introduced the National Security Law No. 54, which granted the NSS the power to arrest and detain indefinitely those who expressed critical views of the government, without ever being brought to trial. It further gave the NSS the power to arrest without a warrant anyone suspected of a crime involving "national security". Article 1 of the law prohibited "acts against the independence, unity or security of the State", and capital punishment was mandatory for anyone convicted of such acts.[93]

From the late 1970s, and onwards Barre faced a shrinking popularity and increased domestic resistance. In response, Barre's elite unit, the Red Berets (Duub Cas), and the paramilitary unit called the Victory Pioneers carried out systematic terror against the Majeerteen, Hawiye, and Isaaq clans.[94] The Red Berets systematically smashed water reservoirs to deny water to the Majeerteen and Isaaq clans and their herds. More than 2,000 members of the Majeerteen clan died of thirst, and an estimated 50,000 to 200,000 Isaaq were killed by the government. Members of the Victory Pioneers also raped large numbers of Majeerteen and Isaaq women, and more than 500,000 Isaaq members fled to Ethiopia.[95][96]

In January 1979 Barre ordered the execution of ten sheiks who were arrested for their religious beliefs. The religious community had begun to exhibit opposition to Barre's furthered attempt to secularize Somalia. This egregious violation of freedom of speech was condemned by Amnesty International. Many Somalis believe this event was the tipping point that led to the state's eventual failure.[97]

Clanism

After the Ogaden War, Barre adopted a "clanism" ideology and abandoned his "socialist facade" to hold onto power.[84] A 120,000 strong army was built for internal repression of the public and to encourage rural clan based conflicts in addition to urban clan directed massacres by specialised armed forces.[84] Barre also singled out the Isaaq clan for a "neo-fascist" type punishment resulting in a "semi-colonial" type subjugation which fuelled collective self assertion to supporters of the Somali National Movement.[84]

By the mid-1980s, more resistance movements supported by Ethiopia's communist Derg administration had sprung up across the country. Barre responded by ordering punitive measures against those he perceived as locally supporting the guerrillas, especially in the northern regions. The clampdown included bombing of cities, with the northwestern administrative center of Hargeisa, a Somali National Movement (SNM) stronghold, among the targeted areas in 1988.[98][99] The bombardment was led by General Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, Barre's son-in-law, and resulted in the deaths of 50,000 people in the north.[100]

Rebellion and ouster

After fallout from the unsuccessful Ogaden campaign, Barre's administration began arresting government and military officials under suspicion of participation in the 1978 coup d'état attempt.[101][102] Most of the people who had allegedly helped plot the putsch were summarily executed.[103] However, several officials managed to escape abroad and started to form the first of various dissident groups dedicated to ousting Barre's regime by force.[104]

A new constitution was promulgated in 1979 under which elections for a People's Assembly were held. However, Barre and the politburo of his Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party continued to rule.[50] In October 1980, the SRSP was disbanded, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council was re-established in its place.[49] By that time, the moral authority of Barre's ruling Supreme Revolutionary Council had begun to weaken. Many Somalis were becoming disillusioned with life under military dictatorship. The regime was further weakened in the 1980s as the Cold War drew to a close and Somalia's strategic importance was diminished. The government became increasingly totalitarian, and resistance movements, supported by Ethiopia's communist Derg administration, sprang up across the country. This eventually led in 1991 to the outbreak of the civil war, the toppling of Barre's regime and the disbandment of the Somali National Army (SNA). Among the militia groups that led the rebellion were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), together with the non-violent political oppositions of the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG). Siad Barre escaped from his palace towards the Kenyan border in a tank.[105] Many of the opposition groups subsequently began competing for influence in the power vacuum that followed the ousting of Barre's regime. In the south in particular, armed factions led by USC commanders General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed clashed as each sought to exert authority over the capital.[106]

Exile and death

After fleeing Mogadishu on 26 January 1991 with his son-in-law General Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, Barre temporarily remained in Burdhubo, in southwestern Somalia, his family's stronghold.[107] Barre fled in a tank filled with reserves from the Somali central bank.[108][109][110][111] This included gold and foreign currency estimated to have been worth $27 million.[108]

From there, he launched a military campaign to return to power. He twice attempted to retake Mogadishu, but in May 1991 was overwhelmed by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid's army and forced into exile. Barre initially moved to Nairobi, Kenya, but opposition groups there protested his arrival and the Kenyan government's support for him. In response to the pressure and hostilities, he moved two weeks later to Nigeria. Barre died of a heart attack on 2 January 1995, in Lagos.[112] His body was returned to his hometown of Garbaharey for burial on a Bluebird Aviation flight paid for and escorted by Nigerian diplomats that took advantage of gaps in radar coverage across Africa to obfuscate the true purpose of the journey.[113]

Honours

See also

References

  1. Kingsley, Charles (22 May 2012). A Vet in Somalia. Xlibris Corporation. p. 229. ISBN 978-1-4771-0284-8. Archived from the original on 22 May 2024. Retrieved 27 April 2024.
  2. Yihun, Belete Belachew (2014). "Ethiopian foreign policy and the Ogaden War: the shift from "containment" to "destabilization," 1977–1991". Journal of Eastern African Studies. 8 (4): 677–691. doi:10.1080/17531055.2014.947469. ISSN 1753-1055. S2CID 145481251.
  3. 1 2 3 4 Library of Congress. Federal Research Division (1993). "Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism". In Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Somalia: A Country Study. U.S. Government Publishing Office. ISBN 9780844407753. Archived from the original on 22 May 2024. Retrieved 1 July 2017.
  4. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division (1993). "Siad Barre's Repressive Measures". In Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Somalia: A Country Study. U.S. Government Publishing Office. ISBN 9780844407753.
  5. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division (1993). "The Social Order". In Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Somalia: A Country Study. U.S. Government Publishing Office. ISBN 9780844407753.
  6. 1 2 3 "Mohamed Siad Barre | president of Somalia | Britannica". Encyclopedia Britannica. Archived from the original on 26 December 2019. Retrieved 1 October 2022.
  7. 1 2 "Mohamed Siad Barre (1910-1995) •". 27 May 2021. Archived from the original on 1 October 2022. Retrieved 1 October 2022.
  8. James, George (3 January 1995). "Somalia's Overthrown Dictator, Mohammed Siad Barre, is Dead". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 19 January 2017. Retrieved 18 February 2017.
  9. Shillington, Kevin (4 July 2013). Encyclopedia of African History 3-Volume Set. Routledge. ISBN 9781135456702 via Google Books.
  10. 1 2 3 Frankel, Benjamin (1992). The Cold War, 1945-1991: Leaders and other important figures in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and the Third World. Gale Research. pp. 306. ISBN 9780810389281.
  11. Tyndall, Christopher R. "Mogadiscio's Unenlightened Pilgrim: Farah's “Links,” Dante's “Inferno,” and the Somali Civil War." comparative literature studies 57.2 (2020): 235-264.
  12. "Maj. General Siad Barre". rpl.hds.harvard.edu. Archived from the original on 1 October 2022. Retrieved 1 October 2022.
  13. "Siad Barre's Rule in Somalia: Force and Guile With AM-Somalia". AP News. Archived from the original on 1 October 2022. Retrieved 1 October 2022.
  14. Kaplan, Irving. Area Handbook for Somalia. Department of Defense, Department of the Army. p. 336.
  15. 1 2 Tripodi, Paolo. The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope. Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. 47.
  16. S Coleman, James. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. University of California Press. pp. 522–523.
  17. Power, Wealth and Global Equity An International Relations Textbook for Africa. p. 104.
  18. Collins, Douglas. A tear for Somalia. p. 168.
  19. "Carabinieri Police College in Italy - 1952 | Somali President Jaalle Maxamed Siyaad Barre". www.jaallesiyaad.com. Retrieved 1 October 2022.
  20. Archived at Ghostarchive and the Wayback Machine: Mohamed Amin (5 March 2014). "President Mohamed Siad Barré and Somali Officials speaking italian Part 1" via YouTube.
  21. Horn of Africa briefing (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. p. 3.
  22. "Attempt to kill Somali governor". December 1963.
  23. Deputies Fight, Then Vote Somali Public Order Law. New York Times. 1963. Opposition deputies attacked several officials, inflicting minor injuries, during Thursday's debate.
  24. Douglas, Jim (1969). The Toughest Peace Corps Job: Letters from Somalia, 1969 by Jim Douglas. Inkwater Press. p. 119. One of the other guys in ag, located in another small town near Baidoa, got to listen to a 3-hour [shootout] right outside his mundel. Ten killed. Another guy in our group was riding in a USAID Land Rover when they were stopped at a barricade of thorn bushes thrown across the road by a bunch of guys who wanted to kill the leader of the opposition party in Baidoa. This goes on all the time.
  25. Douglas, Jim (1969). The Toughest Peace Corps Job. p. 118.
  26. "Somalia gets more aid then can use". Fort Myers. 1969. p. 22.
  27. "Somalis burdened with too much aid". The Los Angeles Times. 1967. p. 44.
  28. "Bled Dry?". Northern Echo. April 1969. p. 1.
  29. Kiley, Dennis (March 1971). "Government's emphasis on independence after bloodless revolution". The Times. p. 27.
  30. APPLE Jr, R. W. (September 1969). "Somali Nomads Dying as Drought Depletes Herds". New York Times. p. 14.
  31. Behind the U.S. Invasion of Somalia Statements of the Workers League. Labor Publications, Incorporated. p. 40.
  32. Douglas, Jim (1969). The Toughest Peace Corps Job. pp. 240–241.
  33. "Somali MPs tried". The Huntsville Times. May 1970. p. 39.
  34. "The Country Is Overrun with Refugees". New York Times. July 1975. p. 152.
  35. "B.H Reception Fetes Somali Minister". Los Angeles Evening Citizen News. October 1969. p. 1.
  36. Aden Sheikh, Mohamed. Back to Mogadishu (in Italian). p. 43.
  37. Somali Presidential Election Upcoming (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. 1967. p. 22.
  38. Morris, Roger (1974). Somalia: Campaign financing around the llorn of Africa (PDF). National Security Studies. p. 19. Egal visited the US following a visit to Somalia by Vice President Humphrey, and was hailed by President Johnson as "enormously constructive in a troubled area of Africa." What the two leaders did not discuss, say official sources, was how "constructive" the CIA had been for Mr. Egal, whose rise to power was reportedly facilitated by thousands of dollars in covert support to Egal and other pro-Western elcments in the ruling Somali Youth League Party prior to the 1967 Presidential election.
  39. Somali Army Wants More Soviet Arms (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. April 1968. p. 22.
  40. Somali Prime Minister At Turning Point (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. October 1969. p. 20. Egal is apparently not in serious trouble yet despite grumbling among politicians and оссаsional rumors of difficulties between him and President Scermarche.
  41. First Assignment in USAID/Somalia-1963-1967 (PDF). The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection Foreign Assistance Series. 1999. p. 10.
  42. CIA ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA (PDF). Soviet state radio. 1969.
  43. Kissinger, Henry (20 October 1969). Political Implication of Assassination of Somali President (PDF) (memorandum). Retrieved 4 February 2025.
  44. Ingiriis, Mohamed Haji (April–June 2017). "Who Assassinated the Somali President in October 1969? The Cold War, the Clan Connection, or the Coup d'État". African Security. 10 (2). Taylor & Francis: 131–132. doi:10.1080/19392206.2017.1305861. JSTOR 48598936.
  45. Lewis, I. M. (October 1972). "The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup". The Journal of Modern African Studies. 10 (3). Cambridge University Press: 383–408. doi:10.1017/S0022278X0002364X (inactive 18 September 2025).{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of September 2025 (link)
  46. Adan Sheikh, Mohamed (1991). Arrivederci a Mogadiscio (in Italian). Edizioni associate. p. 76. ISBN 9788826700700.
  47. Metz, Helen C., ed. (1992), "Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism", Somalia: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, retrieved 21 October 2009{{citation}}: CS1 maint: deprecated archival service (link).
  48. Oihe Yang, Africa South of the Sahara 2001, 30th Ed., (Taylor and Francis: 2000), p.1025.
  49. 1 2 3 Peter John de la Fosse Wiles, The New Communist Third World: an essay in political economy, (Taylor & Francis: 1982), p.279.
  50. 1 2 The Encyclopedia Americana: complete in thirty volumes. Skin to Sumac. Vol. 25. Grolier. 1995. p. 214. ISBN 9780717201266 via Google Books.
  51. Merosi, Mauro. Somalia (in Italian). SEAM. p. 73.
  52. Overseas Business Reports. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce. p. 4.
  53. Area Handbook for Somalia. Department of Defense. 1977. p. 265.
  54. Area Handbook for Somalia. Department of defense. p. 280.
  55. Noteworthy progress in cattle breeding Somalia. United States. Joint Publications Research Service. October 1976. p. 65.
  56. Chapin Metz, Helen (1992). Somalia: a country study (PDF). Federal Research Division Library of Congress. p. 143.
  57. Overseas Business Reports. U.S. Department of Commerce,. 1980. p. 5.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  58. Overseas Business Reports. U.S. Department of Commerce. p. 1.
  59. Background Notes, Sudan. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. 1980. p. 1.
  60. Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983. Cornell University. p. 253.
  61. Generating Employment and Incomes in Somalia. United Nations. 1989. p. 141.
  62. Generating Employment and Incomes in Somalia. United Nations Development Programme. p. 31. From this it may be calculated that 17% of the population fell below the poverty threshold.This must be considered remarkably low compared to other African countries and vindicates our visual impression of lack of adject poverty in urban Somalia. ' Shanty areas are rare and obvious signs of malnutrition rarer still.
  63. P. Potholm, Christian (1979). The theory and practice of African politics. Prentice-Hall. p. 203. 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘣𝘦𝘦𝘯 𝘦𝘹𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 1969 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘱 𝘪𝘯 𝘚𝘰𝘮𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘢, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘣𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘱𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘳 𝘢𝘭𝘮𝘰𝘴𝘵 𝘱𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘸𝘩𝘰 𝘴𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘱𝘭𝘺 𝘳𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘤𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘳𝘶𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯.
  64. World Hunger, Health, and Refugee Problems. United States. Congress. Senate. Committee. p. 153. The socialistic regime of General Siad has survived five years, and imposes a stable and effective government on the Horn of Africa today. It is almost certainly one of the least corrupt governments in Africa
  65. Area Handbook for Somalia. Department of Defense, Department of the Army. 1977. pp. 205 206.
  66. Somalia: The Socialist Revolution Faces A Stiff Economic Challenge (PDF). CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 1971. p. 3. The SRC inherited a Herculean task. The country is arid and lacking in resources, the economy is simple and undeveloped (see Table 1), and most of its 2.8 million people depend on nomadic herding and subsistence agriculture for their livelihood. Past development programs, overly ambitious and inefficiently administered, accomplished little except to give Somalia a reputation for squandering foreign aid. A devastating drought and declining foreign aid posed further problems for the council.
  67. Selected Water Resources Abstracts. The Center. 1988. p. 70.
  68. Area Handbook for Somalia. Department of Defense,. 1977. pp. 256 257. A declared goal of policy in 1974 was to reduce the disparity in living standards between south and north.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  69. Samatar, Abdi Ismail. The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986. University of Wisconsin Press. p. 129. In Galooley, the cooperative movement, at the multipurpose level, started in 1973, when members of the government traveled there and called meetings for the peasants. A state official delivered lectures about the superiority of cooperative farming
  70. Foreign Economic trends. International Trade Administration. 1988. p. 4.
  71. Herbold Green, Reignald (1987). SOMALIA:Paradoxes of Private Prosperity, Poverty Pockets, Volatile Vulnerability and Public Pauperisation. UNICEF. p. 3. Levels of absolute poverty and of malnutrition appear to be markedly lower in Somalia than in most other low income SSA economies
  72. Rebuillding resilient and sustainable agriculture in Somalia (Full report). Food & Agriculture Org. 2018. p. 20.
  73. Somalia, a Country Study. Michigan State University. 1982. p. 176.
  74. Douglas, Jim (1969). The Toughest Peace Corps Job: Letters from Somalia. Inkwater Press. p. 240.
  75. The 1994 national census was delayed in the Somali Region until 1997. FDRE States: Basic Information - Somalia Archived 22 May 2005 at the Wayback Machine, Population (accessed 12 March 2006)
  76. Francis Vallat, First report on succession of states in respect of treaties: International Law Commission twenty-sixth session 6 May – 26 July 1974, (United Nations: 1974), p.20
  77. Africa Watch Committee, Kenya: Taking Liberties, (Yale University Press: 1991), p.269
  78. "Synd 21 7 78 President Barre of Somalia Speech Against Russians at OAU Conference". YouTube. 24 July 2015. Archived from the original on 24 February 2020. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
  79. Gorman, Robert F. (1981). Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa. Westport, CT: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-030-59471-7. p.208
  80. Ingiriis, Mohamed (1 April 2016). The Suicidal State in Somalia: The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969–1991. United States: University Press of America. pp. 147–150. ISBN 978-0-7618-6719-7. Archived from the original on 23 March 2023. Retrieved 21 May 2020 via Google Books.
  81. "President Reagan Meeting with President Siad Barre of Somalia. Oval Office on March 11, 1982". YouTube. 19 April 2017. Archived from the original on 17 February 2020. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
  82. Mugabe, Faustin (20 November 2017). "Somalia's Siad Barre saves Amin from Tanzanians". Daily Monitor. Archived from the original on 28 March 2019. Retrieved 28 March 2019.
  83. Kellerhoff, Sven Felix (30 July 2009). Döpfner, Mathias; Michalski, Oliver; Aust, Stefan; Poschardt, Ulf (eds.). "Der Preis für die Befreiung der Mogadischu-Geiseln" [The price for the liberation of the Mogadishu hostages]. WELT (in German). Berlin, Germany: WeltN24 GmbH (Axel Springer SE). Archived from the original on 31 July 2009. Retrieved 27 July 2021.
  84. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Adam, Hussein M. (1994). "Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea". Review of African Political Economy. 21 (59): 21–38. doi:10.1080/03056249408704034. ISSN 0305-6244. JSTOR 4006181.
  85. National Geographic Society (U.S.), National Geographic, Volume 159, (National Geographic Society: 1981), p.765.
  86. Hadden, Robert Lee. 2007. "The Geology of Somalia: A Selected Bibliography of Somalian Geology, Geography and Earth Science." Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Topographic Engineering Center
  87. 1 2 World of Information (Firm), Africa review, (World of Information: 1987), p.213.
  88. 1 2 Banks, Arthur S.; Muller, Thomas C.; Overstreet, William (2008). Political Handbook of the World 2008. CQ Press. p. 1198.
  89. National Academy of Sciences (U.S.). Committee on Human Rights, Institute of Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Health and Human Rights, Scientists and human rights in Somalia: report of a delegation, (National Academies: 1988), p.9.
  90. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001-Somalia, (New York: 2001), p. 42
  91. Africa Watch Committee, Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People, (New York: 1990), p. 9
  92. Amnesty International, Torture in the Eighties, (Bristol, England: Pitman Press, 1984), p. 127.
  93. National Academy of Sciences (U.S.) Committee on Human Rights & Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee on Health and Human Rights, Scientists and human rights in Somalia: report of a delegation, (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1988), p. 16.
  94. Metz, Helen C., ed. (1992), "Siad Barre's Repressive Measures", Somalia: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, archived from the original on 9 January 2009, retrieved 21 October 2009.
  95. Metz, Helen C., ed. (1992), "Persecution of the Majeerteen", Somalia: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, retrieved 21 October 2009{{citation}}: CS1 maint: deprecated archival service (link).
  96. Metz, Helen C., ed. (1992), "Oppression of the Isaaq", Somalia: A Country Study, Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, retrieved 21 October 2009{{citation}}: CS1 maint: deprecated archival service (link).
  97. Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada. "Somalia: Information on religious mistreatment of Muslims". refworld.org. Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Archived from the original on 14 September 2023. Retrieved 20 June 2023.
  98. "Somalia — Government". Library of Congress. Archived from the original on 4 July 2014. Retrieved 15 February 2014.
  99. Compagnon, Daniel (22 October 2013). "State-sponsored violence and conflict under Mahamed Siyad Barre: the emergence of path dependent patterns of violence". World Peace Foundation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Archived from the original on 2 October 2023. Retrieved 7 October 2014.
  100. "Analysis: Somalia's powerbrokers". BBC News. 8 January 2002. Archived from the original on 9 July 2023. Retrieved 7 October 2014.
  101. ARR: Arab report and record, (Economic Features, ltd.: 1978), p.602.
  102. Ahmed III, Abdul. "Brothers in Arms Part I" (PDF). WardheerNews. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 May 2012. Retrieved 28 February 2012.
  103. New People Media Centre, New people, Issues 94–105, (New People Media Centre: Comboni Missionaries, 2005).
  104. Nina J. Fitzgerald, Somalia: issues, history, and bibliography, (Nova Publishers: 2002), p.25.
  105. Perlez, Jane (28 October 1991). "Insurgents Claiming Victory in Somalia". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 28 October 2017. Retrieved 28 October 2017.
  106. Library Information and Research Service, The Middle East: Abstracts and index, Volume 2, (Library Information and Research Service: 1999), p.327.
  107. Bradbury, Mark (1994). The Somali conflict : prospects for peace. Oxford [England]: Oxfam. ISBN 0-85598-271-3. OCLC 33119727.
  108. 1 2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Refworld | Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1990 - 1995". Refworld. Archived from the original on 19 December 2021. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  109. Perlez, Jane (28 January 1991). "Insurgents Claiming Victory in Somalia". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 28 October 2017. Retrieved 21 October 2020.
  110. Perlez, Jane (28 January 1991). "Insurgents Claiming Victory in Somalia (Published 1991)". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 28 October 2017. Retrieved 28 January 2021.
  111. Alasow, Omar Abdulle (17 May 2010). Violations of the Rules Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts and Their Possible Causes: The Case of Somalia. BRILL. ISBN 978-90-04-18988-1 via Google Books.
  112. "Former Somalian President Mohamed Siad Barré Dies". The Washington Post.
  113. "Somalia's Siad Barre: Kenyan pilot tells BBC of his secret mission to fly his body from Nigeria". www.bbc.com. 9 January 2026. Retrieved 9 January 2026.
  114. "Korea Today". Foreign Languages Publishing House (191): 10. 1972.
  115. "Oдликовања". Službeni list SFRJ. XXXII (44): 1368. 8 October 1976. Archived from the original on 23 February 2024. Retrieved 29 February 2024.

Further reading